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Case No. 20160995-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER KIM LEECH,
Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant is incarcerated.
__________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Leech was charged with aggravated murder, two counts of aggravated
kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and obstructing justice. The
charges stemmed from the alleged kidnapping and robbery of Andy Beck and
Cleat Knight; the shooting death of Knight; and subsequent destruction of
evidence. The alleged offenses occurred in three locations: The Mann Way home,
Uncle Chris’ apartment, and Snowbasin Resort (Snowbasin). There was almost
no physical evidence of the offenses. The physical evidence recovered included a
handgun; and two shell casings and two bullets that did not match the gun.
Therefore, witness credibility was critical.
At the preliminary hearing, co-defendant Theron Myore’s testimony was a
critical for the State to establish the offenses against Leech. Leech cross-

examined Myore at the hearing, but structural and other limitations did not give
Leech a similar motive or opportunity to challenge Myore’s credibility. All the
testimonies of the State’s witnesses materially conflicted. The ability of Leech to
undermine Myore’s credibility through cross-examination regarding his
numerous inconsistent statements was imperative to Leech’s overall defense.
The day before trial, the State informed Leech that Myore had threatened
to refuse to testify. However, it was not until the first day of trial that Leech was
given notice of Myore’s actually refusal. And, it was not until the second day of
trial, after the jury had been selected, that the trial court ruled on Myore’s
availability and subsequent admissibility of his preliminary hearing testimony.
The court ruled Myore’s testimony was admissible under rule 804, Utah Rules of
Evidence. Leech’s request for a continuance was denied. Myore’s testimony was
admitted through a district attorney who sat on the witness stand, and in
response to the questions asked by counsel from the transcript, read Myore’s
answers.
Leech raises two arguments on appeal. First, the trial court erred by
finding Myore unavailable under rule 804, and admitting Myore’s preliminary
hearing testimony at trial. The State did not meet its high burden of proving that
Leech had a similar motive and opportunity to challenge Myore’s credibility
through cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. This error warrants
reversal because absent the admission of Myore’s testimony a reasonable
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likelihood existed that the result of the trial would have been more favorable to
Leech.
Second, the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors in admitting
Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony establishes prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing
testimony of a critical State witness.
Standard /Preservation: “When reviewing rulings on hearsay, [this Court
will] review ‘[l]egal questions regarding admissibility ... for correctness, ...
questions of fact ... for clear error,’ and the final ‘ruling on admissibility for abuse
of discretion.”’ State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶10 (citation omitted). “An
‘error warrants reversal only if … a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the
error, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.’” State v.
Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶48 (citation omitted).
Issue II: Whether the cumulative effect of multiple errors was prejudicial.
Standard of Review/Preservation: Issues raised under the cumulative
error doctrine need not be preserved. This Court will “apply the ‘standard of
review applicable to each underlying claim or error.’” State v. Davis, 2013 UT
App 228, ¶16.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Leech was charged by with the following: Aggravated murder, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code §76-5-202; two counts of Aggravated
3

Kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code §76-5-302; two
counts of Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
§76-6-302; and Obstructing Justice, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code §76-8-306(1). R.1-4, 121-22, 403-07. At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, Leech was bound over. R.116-22, 1251-1621.
A six-day jury trial was held in September 2016. R.544-50, 562-64, 727-28,
739-41. Leech was found guilty on all counts. R.739-48; Addendum A. He was
sentenced as follows: Aggravated Murder, life in prison without parole (LWOP);
Aggravated Kidnapping, two indeterminate term of 15 years-to-life; Aggravated
Robbery, two indeterminate terms of 5 years-to-life; Obstructing Justice, an
indeterminate term of 5 years-to-life. R.805-08. The court ordered the
Aggravated Murder conviction to run consecutively to one Aggravated
Kidnapping conviction, all other counts were run concurrently. Id. Leech timely
appealed. R.809-14.
The supreme court stayed Leech’s appeal pending decisions in State v.
Pham, 20160502-SC, and State v. Goins, 20160485-SC. See Addendum C (Order
dated February 15, 2017). Leech’s appeal was poured over to this Court. See
Addendum D (Letter dated March 15, 2018).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Offense.
Cleat Knight’s body was discovered in a remote area of Snowbasin on
January 6, 2014. R.2231, 2282-283, 2413, 2422-428; StEx.73. Knight’s body
4

under 2-3 feet of snow at the bottom of a small embankment. R.2285-288;
StEx.21. He died from two gunshot wounds—one to his torso and one to his head.
R.2249-250, 2257-264. The bullets entered and exited Knight’s body. R.2249253, 2294. Knight’s hoodie had holes consistent with the entry and exit torso
wounds. R.2238-240, 2293-296; StExs.40-41. Entry and exit wounds were found
on the upper thigh and shin of his left leg and corresponded with the wounds on
his torso—if his legs had been extended out in front of him. R.2243-2245, 2254257, 2269-270; StExs.40-41. Knight had on socks but no shoes. R.2233-36, 2247248, 2264, 2292-293. Speaker wire was wrapped loosely around his clothed
wrists but they were not bound together. Id. No personal effects were found on
Knight. R.2293-294.
The State’s case.
The State alleged that on November 22-23, 2013, Christopher Leech and
co-defendants Tina Soules, Theron Myore, and Viliamu Seumanu (Juice) were
involved with the kidnapping and robbery of Andy Beck and Knight. R.1-4, 40307. After being bound, robbed and blindfolded, Andy and Knight were driven to
Snowbasin and Leech shot Knight in the back and forced Andy to shoot him.
R.583-626, 1852-1902. The alleged offenses took place over three locations: the
Mann Way home, Uncle Chris’ apartment, and Snowbasin.
Leech destroyed clothing and weapons. R.629-33, 1907-08, 2365-72, 251117. The only physical evidence of the offense recovered was a handgun—found in
Vernal; and shell casings and bullets that did not match the gun. Id. The majority
5

of evidence establishing Leech’s guilt came from the testimony of Andy, Tawnie
Gallegos—Andy’s friend; Dawnie Soules—Tina’s sister and Juice’s wife; and the
preliminary hearing testimony of Myore—Tina’s boyfriend. R.565-724, 18022004, 2030-2169.
Background.
Andy reported Knight’s death after his arrest by Agent Smiley for violating
his FBI agreement. R.1922, 1942-43. Andy had agreed to work with Smiley in
exchange for federal drug dealing charges being dropped against him. R.1922,
1942-43.
High-ranking member of Soldiers of the Aryan Culture (SAC). Andy served
almost 10 years in prison for violating the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) act—committing a violent crime in furtherance of
an organization. R.1977-78. While in prison, Andy was a SAC “General”—
commanding 150 fellow inmates. R.1978, 1997. As a general, he was responsible
for the physical punishment of those who “stepped out of line.” R.1978-79. Andy
was convicted of felony assault by a prisoner for cutting another gang member
with a knife during an ongoing gang war. R.1977-78, 2000. He was released from
prison in 2009. R.1830-33, 1978. Andy has also been convicted of several felonies
and crimes of dishonesty. He was on probation in November 2013, after being
convicted of felony theft by receiving and theft in October and November 2012.
R.1830-31, 1932-33.
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Cartel drug dealing. Andy was dealing drugs for a cartel when he was
arrested in June 2013, and charged with numerous offenses for possession of
controlled substances and forgery. R.1931-34, 1942, 1979-80. He was desperate to
get out of jail because he feared going back to prison. R.1935. Agent Smiley came
to the jail to inform Andy that federal drug dealing charges would be filed unless
he agreed to connect Smiley with the drug cartel. R.1922, 1942-43. To avoid
prison, Andy agreed to work with Smiley in exchange for charges not being filed.
Id. After his release, Andy reneged on his agreement and disappeared. R.1943.
He continued to deal drugs while he moved from motel to motel to avoid being
found. Id.
Andy’s rearrested. Police arrested Andy in a motel, sometime between
November 27 and 30, 2013, for possession of a weapon—brass knuckles. R.192021, 1935-44. Andy was now desperate to get out of jail before Smiley could locate
him. R.1943. He tried writing the court to order his released. R.1937. He also
called Tina Soules and his girlfriend, Jen, to bail him out. R.1921-22, 1937. Jen
paid Andy’s bail and he was released at the end of November. R.1921-22, 19371942. On the way to Jen’s home, Andy told her about Knight’s death, and
discussed contacting the FBI. R.1922, 1944. Jen called Agent Smiley. Id. When
Andy woke the next day, Smiley was waiting for him. Id.
Andy report’s Knight’s death. Andy admitted lying about “everything”
during his interviews with law enforcement. R.1923-27, 1950-51. He claimed he
lied because he has “been a criminal for most of [his] life, so it’s hard to tell the
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police the truth.” R.1959-60. Andy could not remember when he stopped lying in
these interviews, but claimed he told the truth when he testified in court. R.1927,
1938-39, 1947-51, 1992.
FBI Agents interviewed Andy 3 or 4 times about Knight’s death, between
late November and December 6, 2013. R.1922-23, 1942-45. Andy’s version of
events kept changing, so after he failed twice to lead the agents to Knight’s body,
Andy was booked back into jail. R.1926-27, 1944-48. Smiley said he was done
with Andy, and turned the case over to Detective McCarthy with West Valley
Police. Id.
In his December 12 interview with McCarthy, Andy said he would not talk
about Knight’s death until McCarthy released him from jail. R.1947-508, 2417.
On December 31, McCarthy drove Andy to Snowbasin to look for Knight’s body,
but Andy failed to locate it. R.1928, 1950, 2417. On the way back to jail, Andy
began to cry because he thought McCarthy did not believe him. R.2421.
Myore led detectives to Knight’s body, about 200-feet from where Andy
told detectives to look. R.2422-23. Andy was charged with obstructing justice for
lying to law enforcement. R.1950-51, 1973. If Andy testified truthfully, the State
agreed to recommend a sentence of probation—no prison. R.1998.
Trial Testimony-Law Enforcement Interviews.
Friendship with Knight, Tina, and others. Andy testified as follows: He had
known Knight almost 20 years and considered him his best friend, R1829; the
two began hanging out a few months prior to November 2013, after Knight was
8

released from a halfway house, R.1829-30; Knight and Andy sold drugs and got
high on methamphetamines (meth), R.1829-30.
Andy had dated Tina Soules in high school, and knew her older sister
Dawnie, but had not seen them in 13-years, R.1821-26, 2107-08; A week prior to
November 22-23, 2013, Andy got back in touch with Tina, and met Myore—her
boyfriend, R.1821-26, 1965; Andy met Juice—Dawnie’s husband—two weeks
earlier when Dawnie sold him bath salts—a synthetic speed, similar to meth,
R1823-26; Andy had been using bath salts for a few months, and had previously
used meth, R.1824-25; Andy met Tawnie Gallegos when he and Knight moved
into a home in Magna—two weeks before Thanksgiving 2013. R.1835-37, 203536, 2061-62.
Andy purchased meth for Tina. Andy testified as follows: He began helping
Tina sell drugs, R.1966, 1972; On November 22, 2013, Tina called and asked him
to buy meth from his supplier, R.1833-34; Tina gave Andy $2,200, for the meth,
and loaned him a rented white Dodge to pick up the meth, Id.; Andy’s supplier
only had half of the amount of meth Tina wanted, but would receive more the
next day, R.1835-37; Andy hid the meth he purchased in the rental car, R.183839.
Tina gave Andy permission to use some of her money to stay at a motel,
with his friend Courtney, until he purchased the remaining meth. R.1835-39,
1929-30.The next day, Andy gave Courtney the rental car to pick up belongings
he and Knight left at the Magna home, R.1837, 1929-30. After unsuccessfully
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trying to reach his supplier, Andy drove to Taylorsville to pick up Knight, R.183738; They went to a friend’s home to get high on bath salts, R.1839-40; Tina called
and told Andy to hurry with the meth because her customer was waiting, but
Andy still could not reach his supplier, R.1840-41.
Knight, the rental, and the meth went missing. Andy testified as follows:
Knight told Andy he could buy the meth Tina wanted in Kearns, but it would cost
more, R.1841-42; Andy gave Knight the rest of Tina’s money and the rental car,
and Knight left, R.1841-42; Andy claimed he did not tell Knight about the meth
hidden in the rental’s trunk, R.1842; Andy continued to communicate with Tina
to let her know he was waiting on the suppliers and he would be over soon,
R.1843; Andy waited several hours for Knight to return, R.1843; Andy had been
communicating with Knight, but Knight stopped answering Andy’s calls, R.1843;
Tina kept calling Andy, but after Knight stopped answering Andy’s calls, Andy
stopped answering Tina’s, R.1843-44; A few hours later, Andy told Tina to pick
him up, R.1844-45; Knight was still not answering Andy’s calls, R.1844.
Knight, the rental, and the meth went missing—Andy’s interviews. In
interviews with the FBI, Andy claimed the following: Knight came into possession
of Tina’s rental car after Knight took it, without permission, from the where
Andy’s motel, R.1960, 1993-94; Andy had left the rental’s keys on his motel
dresser, id; Andy called Knight, gave him the motel’s name, and left the room
keys downstairs for Knight before falling asleep, id; The next morning the rental
was gone and Andy believed Knight took it, id.
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Andy refused the FBI’s request to wear a wire when he was with Tina,
R.1945-46; When agents continued to question Andy’s changing version of
events, he insisted “that is exactly how everything happened… I’m not trying to
hide stuff” and “I told you, I have been real with you. I haven’t lied to you about
anything…I’m being straight with you. There is nothing more. I have told you
everything,” R.1926-27, 1953-54.
Mann Way Home—first scene. Tina lived in a home in West Valley, on
Mann Way (Mann Way home); along with her mother, her sister Teresa—Leech’s
girlfriend; and Leech. R.1846-47, 2107-12.
Andy testified as follows: Tina and her customer—a Caucasian man from
Vernal—picked Andy up before sundown, R.1845-46; On the way to the Mann
Way home, Andy explained that Knight had taken the rental car and gone to
purchase Tina’s meth, id.
At the Mann Way home, Andy and Tina left to drive around with Myore
and look for the Knight, and the rental car, R.1848; Failing to locate Knight or
the car, they returned to the home 20-minutes later, R.1848-49; Andy entered
through the home’s front door and went with Tina straight to the garage to smoke
a cigarette and to continue texting Knight, R.1849-51; Tina’s customer came into
the garage a few times, and they smoked meth together, R.1851, 1961; Otherwise,
Tina and Andy were alone in the garage, while Andy attempted to contact Knight,
R.1850-52;
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After they heard a truck pulled, Tina told Andy “that we need to figure this
out because [Leech] was [t]here and he was going to freak out,” then Tina went
inside, id; Andy had not met Leech before that night, R.1852-53; Leech came into
the garage, pointed a gun at Andy, and asked what was going on, R.1852-54;
Leech’s gun was “a black glock-style, plastic, synthetic pistol,” R.1853; Andy
responded that Knight had taken the rental to buy Tina’s meth, and Andy was
taking care of the situation, R.1853; Leech responded that if Andy “didn’t get it
taken care of it was [Andy’s] ass,” R.1853; Andy was not tied up or blindfolded
while he was in the garage, R.1866.
Leech stayed in the garage until an “Asian guy” arrived, R.1855-61; Leech
told the Asian guy watch Andy and not let him go anywhere, R.1855-60, 1961-62;
The Asian guy sat in a chair by the garage’s back door, id; The Asian guy held a
gun in his lap while he smoked meth; id; Andy did not feel free to leave, R.1856,
1867.
Andy continued for “at least an hour” to reach Knight “before [Leech] took
[his] phone,” R.1861-63; He had texted Knight that “this isn’t a joke… you need to
get ahold of me…you’re going to get me shot,” R.1862-63; Andy fell asleep in the
garage, after a few hours, because he was coming down from bath salts and
adrenaline, R1860-61; Leech nudged him awake, and Andy heard Dawnie and
Juice from the kitchen reading his text messages, R.1861-62; Dawnie yelled for
Leech to “ask him what was in the suitcase,” which referenced the text Andy sent
Knight about picking up their belongs from the Magna home, but not the
12

suitcase, R.1863-64; Leech asked if the meth was in the suitcase, R.1864; Andy
told Leech “just what [he] told Juice, [that it was] just the suitcase that was left
out at the house in Magna,” R.1864.
Andy attempted to go inside, through the kitchen, to use the bathroom,
R.1854-55, 1864-65; But when he opened the kitchen door, Leech told him to get
back in the garage, id; Leech was not holding a gun, R.1855; Andy saw his friend
Tawnie inside the kitchen with Leech, Dawnie, Juice, and Tina, R.1864-67; An
hour later, Leech told Andy it was time to leave, id; Andy walked out of the
home’s front door unassisted, he was not bound or blindfolded at this time,
R.1865-67; The Asian guy stayed behind and Andy never saw him again, R.198889.
Andy got into the backseat of Myore’s truck, with Leech, R.1867-68; Myore
drove, and Juice sat in front, R.1867-68; Leech told Myore, “You know where
we’re going. Let’s go,” but no other conversation took place, R.1868-69; Andy
could see where they were going, but eventually Leech told him to put his hood
up and keep his head down, R.1868; Leech was the only one Andy heard directing
the events, R.1880-81.
Mann Way Home—Andy’s interviews. Andy’s version of events to law
enforcement differed completely.
Andy claimed the following: Leech led Andy directly to the garage, Andy
never entered the home through the front door, R.1948-59, 1989-90; Leech was
the only one with him in the garage, R.1948-50, 1955-64; Only Leech had a gun,
13

id; Leech bound and blindfolded him while he was in the garage, id; He was held
in the garage for two days. R.1959; He never saw Tawnie in the kitchen or at the
Mann Way home at all, R.1985 (FBI interview); Told McCarthy, he was “not
telling [him] anything that was not true and [he would] need [him].” R.1955.
Andy did not report the following: Being held in a garage belonging to
Tina, R.1958; Myore or his involvement, R.1984 (FBI); Any attempt to enter the
home and use the bathroom, R.1958; Being guarded by an Asian man with a gun,
R.1948-50, 1955-59, until asked in a subsequent interview about another Asian
guy with a gun. Then Andy responded, “I didn’t see him with a gun … just [Leech]
… [and] I’d just be making something up” if he said that he could remember,
R.1962-64; that anyone wore a bandana over their face, or being taken to another
apartment, R.1950.
Leaving the Mann Way home, Andy claimed Leech lead him directly from
the garage to the truck, and Knight was already sitting inside the truck before
Andy got inside. R.1950.
Mann Way Home—Tawnie’s trial testimony/interviews. Tawnie’s version
of events at the Mann Way home differed completely from Andy’s and the other
witnesses’ testimony. R.2034-2101.
Tawnie claimed the following: Tawnie lived at the Magna home for a
month before Andy and Knight moved in, R.2034-35, 2061-62, 2091; They all
became friends, id; Right before Thanksgiving, Knight and Andy quit talking to
her, and began acting “weird … kept to the[m]selves,” then moved out, id; Andy
14

and Knight had not left any of their belongings when they moved out, R.2036;
Andy “always talked about robbing somebody,” R.2091-93; The next night, her
friend Chris Clyde, came over with Tina around 9 or 10 p.m., R.2036-38, 2063;
Tina asked her to help find Knight, R.2037-48, 2057; Clyde drove them to the
Mann Way home in his gray car, R.2037-39, 2057-61; Tina insisted Tawnie come
inside—grabbed her hand, told her not to worry, she would not hurt her. R.2039,
2057.
As she entered the Mann Way home: A tall, white man was sitting on the
couch with a bandana around his face, R.2042, 2080; and Myore wore a bandana
around his neck, R.2042-46, 2066, 2083; She explained the difference in
preliminary hearing testimony –that Myore had a bandana over his face—by
claiming Myore wore a bandana over his face at first, but later put it around his
neck, R.2080-81.
Inside the Mann Way home: Tawnie stayed in the kitchen with Clyde, Tina,
Leech, Myore, “Asian Tony,” and Teresa, R.2046, 2082-84; Tawnie did not know
anyone, except Clyde, R.2036-46, 2058; Juice was never there, R.2081; Andy
came out of the garage to use the bathroom, and looked scared, R.2045, 2058,
2097; Myore and Leech pointed their guns at Andy’s head, told him to “get back
in the room,” while they shoved him back into the garage, R.2045-46, 2058-59,
2067-68; After the door shut, Tawnie could not hear anything inside the garage,
R.2060; Leech and Myore were the only ones with guns, R.2045-46.
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Tawnie said Leech was mad, R.2047, He said he would make Knight and
Andy “pay for what they did,” R.2047; And “he was going to shoot [them]” for
“what they took from Tina,” R.2047, 2083-84; Leech and Myore went through
Andy’s phone, reading text messages, and Leech read one out loud, R.2048-49;
Leech wrote down a list of numbers from Andy’s phone, and said he was trying to
locate Knight, R.2049-50; Leech appeared to be the leader of the group, R.205456, 2087.
Inside the garage: Tawnie went in the garage with Leech, Myore and
Clyde, R.2050, 2084-86; Andy was alone, sitting in a chair, R.2050, 2085-86;
Andy’s hands were tied behind his back, but Tawnie did not know if they were
tied with “tape, or zip ties or a rope,” id.; She and Clyde smoked a cigarette for a
few minutes, no one spoke, so it was awkward, R.2051, 2086-87; No one in the
garage smoked meth, bath salts, or had a drug pipe, R.2087.
Leaving Mann Way home: A short time later, Leech and Myore said they
found Knight, R.2051-54, 2088-90; Tawnie had been at the home for twenty to
thirty minutes, id; Andy was “escorted” out to Myore’s truck, R.2052-53; A
bandana covered Andy’s face and eyes, and his hands remained tied behind his
back, R.2052, 2080; Andy was put in the truck’s backseat, Tina and Leech got in
the truck too, and Myore drove them away, R.2052-53; Asian Tony, Teresa, and
the white male, who had the bandana over his face, left in a different truck,
R.2041-44, 2053, 2066-67, 2087, 2107; Clyde drove Tawnie back to the Magna
home, she spent the night, then moved out the next day because she was scared,
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R.2053-54, 2088-90; Tawnie did not attempt to call and warn Knight because
she had asked someone else to do it, R.2090; She went into hiding for a month,
and did not tell anyone what happened, until law enforcement found her, R.2055,
2088-90; Tawnie never saw Andy or anyone from the Mann Way home again.
R.2054-55.
Contrary to her interview statements, Tawnie denied or claimed she could
not remember telling law enforcement the following: Andy and Knight acted
“weird” because Tawnie had overheard them discussing a plan to rob Tina,
R.2063-65, 2091-92; It was Leech and “Asian Tony” who had guns and shoved
Andy back into the garage, not Myore, R.2065; “Everyone [in the home] had a
gun,” not just Leech and Myore, R.2077, 2094; Leech did not pointed his gun at
Andy or anyone else, R.2075-78 (Tawnie identified her voice on an interview
recording telling McCarthy that Leech never pointed a gun at anyone, and did not
pointed a gun at Andy when he came in from the garage); Tawnie could hear,
through the kitchen door, Andy “being struck several times,” while he was in the
garage, R.2060, 2066; Andy “wasn’t duct-taped or tied or anything like that” in
the garage, R.2078-79.
Uncle Chris’ apartment—second scene. Andy testified as follows: Andy was
taken to an apartment in South Salt Lake belonging to “Uncle Chris”—uncle to
Tina, Dawnie, and Teresa, R.1986-87; Andy had never been to Uncle Chris’
apartment before, R.1869, 1986; When Andy arrived, a “Mexican guy” (Uncle
Chris), whom Andy did not know, went into the apartment’s back room, R.198717

88; Andy sat on the couch, and never saw Uncle Chris again, R.1869-72, 1987,
2111-12.
Soon after, Tina and Dawnie arrived and said they had reached Knight, and
he would be coming over, R.1870-72, 1988; Leech then told Andy to lie on the
floor, R.1872-73, 1987; Andy did not remember seeing Leech’s gun, id.; Leech
emptied Andy’s pockets, taking his necklace, money, and meth, R.1873; Leech
took Andy’s shoes, and pulled Andy’s hoodie over his head, R.1874-76; His hands
were tied behind his back, but he could not see who tied them, or what had been
used, R.1874.
Knight came through the door and said, “What’s going on? I got all your
shit,” R.1875, 1987; Leech responded “It’s too late for all that. Get down on the
floor—next to [Andy],” R.1875; When Knight got on the floor, Knight said he
knew of a “come up”1 they could commit, R.1876; Leech said it was too late, id.;
Leech ordered Knight to be searched and Andy could hear someone go through
Knight’s pockets and take off his shoes, R.1876-79; Knight was hands were tied
behind his back, but Andy could not see who tied them, R.1877; Someone cut a
hole in their hoods and tied them to the zipper, R.1879-80; Andy could not see
with his hood covering his face, R.1880-82l; Andy only heard Leech giving
orders, R.1880-81.
Andy did not hear anyone tell Leech, or the others, to stop what they were
doing, R.1880-81; Andy and Knight were walked out to Myore’s truck, and Leech
1

Andy testified that a “come up” usually means a robbery or crime. R.1965.
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said “Fucking get him in the truck,” R.1882-83; Andy believed Juice guided him
to the truck’s passenger-side backseat, R.1883; Knight sat in the middle of the
backseat next to Andy, and Leech sat beside Knight, R.1883-84; Myore drove,
and Juice sat in the front seat, R.1883-84; Leech told the others to turn off their
phones, R1907; And directed Myore to “go up the canyon,” R.1884.
Uncle Chris’ apartment—Dawnie’s trial testimony. Dawnie had been using
bath salts in January 2014, and lied during her first interviewed with law
enforcement, R.2105, 2152-53; She had been high on heroin, and also lied when
she testified at the Leech’s preliminary hearing, id; Dawnie claimed her prior
testimony and interviews were inconsistent with her testimony today because she
had been high on bath salts at the time and had not been able to remember a lot,
except “the tragic things,” and not because she intentionally lied. R.2114-15, 215253. Dawnie insisted she was sober at a March 2015 hearing, and during a
subsequent hearing, because she had been held in jail before she testified,
R.2106; And, Dawnie claimed she was sober as she testified at Leech’s trial, id.;
But she admitted she lied oath about her sobriety in those other hearings, and
Juice’s trial, R.2150-52.
On November 22, 2013, Dawnie and Juice, her husband at the time, spent
the day smoking bath salts, R.2102-13, 2154-56; Dawnie admitted she had been a
drug dealer, and having been convicted of several felonies, id; Dawnie and Juice
had not been to the Mann Way home that day, R.2154; Instead, a male friend had
dropped her and Juice off that evening at her Uncle Chris’ apartment, R.2154;
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Dawnie went there to meet Tina and get more bath salts, id; When she arrived,
Myore’s truck was parked outside. R.2116-17, 2155-57. Tina had arrived with
Myore’s truck with him—Leech and Andy had not come in Myore’s truck, id.
Dawnie, Tina, Myore and Uncle Chris hung out in the apartment and
talked, R.2115-18; Andy, Leech and an “Asian kid” arrived an hour later. R.211822, 2157-59; Andy and Leech arrived together in Teresa’s truck, and the Asian kid
arrived in his own vehicle, R.2128, 2160; Dawnie said Leech looked mad, and
Andy looked scared, R.2122-23, 2157-61; And Leech had a gun in his hand, id.;
Andy was not tied up or blindfolded, R.2159; Dawnie, considered Andy like a
little brother, and asked Leech what was going on, but he told her not to worry
about it, R.2124-25, 2161-62.
Andy and the Asian kid sat on the couch, R.2123-25; Andy started talking
to everyone about bath salts, id; Leech’s phone rang, and he told Juice to answer,
R.2125; It was Knight calling, and Juice relayed Leech’s message that if Knight
brought the rental car back right then, nothing would happen to him, R.2125-26,
2161; Dawnie and Knight were also friends, R.2108-09, 2127; Knight arrived with
the rental car 20-minutes later, R.2126-27, 2161; Dawnie, Juice and Leech went
outside to meet him, id.
Once Knight was inside the apartment, Leech pointed his gun at Knight
and Andy, and told them to get on the floor, Andy had not been tied up before
that point, R.2130-31, 2161; Leech asked Myore to get something to tie them up
with, and Myore left the apartment, R.2131; Dawnie told Andy to say something,
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and he responded, “I’ve known these guys all my life. I would never hurt them,”
R.2142-43; Leech told Andy to shut up, id; Myore returned with speaker wire and
his gun, R.2132, 2160; Leech told Myore to tie them up, id; Myore bound Andy
and Knights hands, and Leech tied their hoodies over their faces with the speaker
wire, R.2133-38; Leech removed everything from Andy’s and Knight’s pockets,
and stood them up, id; Uncle Chris and Tina continued to talk in the kitchen,
while Dawnie, Juice, and the Asian kid watched, R.2134; Dawnie cried because
she thought no one would be coming back alive, including her husband Juice,
R.2162-63; So while he was tied up, Dawnie asked Andy where his bath salts
were, R.2143, 2164; Andy told Dawnie they were back at his motel, id.
Dawnie told Leech he was “not taking [her] husband with [him],” R.2140;
But Leech pointed his gun at her, and “Juice automatically went out the door with
him,” id. Leech and Myore walked Andy and Knight outside to Myore’s truck,
R.2139; Leech told Dawnie he was just “going to take their shoe from them and
they’re going to walk down the mountain with their bare feet,” R.2138-41; Leech
was in charge of the events, id; Leech told Dawnie and Tina to go home, id.;
Myore drove off with Leech, Juice, Andy, and Knight, id.; Dawnie did not try to
call police, R.2164; And she did not try to call Juice because Leech had taken
everyone’s phone, R.2164; Dawnie told police Leech had smashed everyone’s
phone, but admitted at trial that Juice called her from his phone the next
morning, R.2165.
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Dawnie left in the rental car, and drove to Andy’s motel to look for his bath
salts, R.2144, 2164; Dawnie asked the girl in Andy’s room where Andy kept his
bath salts, R.2144; The girl did not know, but showed her Andy’s belonging, id;
Dawnie loaded all of Andy’s belongings—two crates and a bag—into the rental car
and returned to the Mann Way home, R.2144-45; She arrived around midnight,
and Tina was asleep on the couch, id; Dawnie returned to her home in West
Jordan, id.
At dawn, Juice called Dawnie to pick him up at the Mann Way home,
R.2146; Dawnie thought Juice seemed distant, but they never talked about what
happened, R.2146-49; Andy had been taking a shower, R.2147; Andy looked sad
but did not talk about what happened, id; Five days later, Leech came over to
Dawnie’s home and smoked bath salts with her and Juice, R.2149; As they were
smoking, “water dripped on Juice’s foil and he said it was a tear drop from
[Knight],” id; Dawnie knew then what had happened, id.
Dawnie claimed she could not remember, from law enforcement
interviews or previous testimony, stating the following: Telling law enforcement
that Juice’s sister dropped them off at Uncle Chris’ apartment, not a male friend,
R.2156; Leech did not pull out his gun until after Knight arrived, not that he had
it in his hand when he arrived, id; The Asian kid had been the one to walk Andy
and Knight out to the truck with Leech, not Myore, R.2165; Juice had never gone
up the canyon with Leech, R.2153.
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At Juice’s trial, testifying Leech sat with Andy and the Asian kid on the
couch, holding his gun the entire timer.2157-59; Andy had appeared normal, not
alarmed, id; At Leech’s preliminary hearing, testifying Leech was the only one
who had a gun, not that Myore had a gun too, id.
Uncle Chris’ apartment—Uncle Chris’ testimony. Chris admitted he lied to
law enforcement when first interviewed, R.2176-77, 2216; He claimed to have lied
because he was afraid of Leech and the others, R.2177; He could not remember
every version he told, but said everyone lies, R.2215; He claimed to law
enforcement that he had not witnessed what occurred inside his apartment, on
the date of the incident, because he went to his bedroom when everyone arrived.
R.2177, 2206.
Chris testified as follows: Teresa called and had asked Chris if Tina could
meet someone at his apartment who owed her drug money, R.2178, 2216-17; Tina
and Dawnie were drug dealers, R.2208; But Tina was like a daughter to Chris,
although he was not close to Teresa or Dawnie, R.2181-82, 2208.
Leech, Myore, Juice, and Andy were the first to arrive, R.2180-81; an Asian
kid also showed up with them, R.2180; Chris had only seen Juice four or five
times before, he did not know him well, R.2182; Chris had only met Myore once
before, R.2183; Chris had never met Leech, R.2182-83, 2208-11; But Chris was
not surprised to see Andy at the apartment because he had come over with Tina,
a month or two before, R.2183, 2210. Andy, Juice and Myore sat on the couch,
while Leech stood, R.2188.
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Fifteen minutes later, Tina and Dawnie arrived, R.2181, 2187; Knight
arrived last and walked inside “like nothing was happening,” R.2188; Leech asked
Knight for “the money or whatever,” Knight handed it to Leech and told him
everything was there, R.2188-89; Juice then pulled out a big black gun, 2189-94;
Without being told, Myore left to get speaker wire, R.2189-90; When Myore
returned, Leech pointed his nickel-plated gun at Andy and Knight, told them to
lay on the floor, and Myore tied them up, R.2189-94; Leech took the stuff from
their pockets, and took their shoes, R.2191-93; Leech tied their hoods to the
zipper of their hoodies with the speaker wire, R.2192-95; Leech and Juice were
the only ones with guns, not Myore or the others, R.2199.
Leech and Juice, not Myore, picked up Knight and Andy, and walked them
out to the truck, R.2195-99; Chris and everyone else watched, R.2198; There was
no discussion, R.2198; Chris said Leech controlled what happened, R.2199; Chris
never talked to anyone who had been at his apartment again, R.2203.
Snowbasin—final scene. Andy testified as follows: He fell asleep on the way
up the canyon, R.1885-87; Myore stopped for gas and Andy heard Leech tell
Myore “just to be cool,” R.1885; Knight asked Leech to let them go, but Leech told
him to shut up, “it was too late,” R.1886; Back on freeway, Leech gave Myore
directions, R.1885; Andy was “coming in and out of sleep,” so he was unaware
how long they drove, R.1885-87; Andy claimed he was able to sleep because he
“was shutting down…thought [he] was going to be dead,” R1886.
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Myore stopped in Snowbasin, Andy did not know where, R.1888; Leech
took Knight out of the truck and told Juice to get Andy, R.1888; Juice helped
Andy from the truck, pushed his head under a gate, and held his arm as they
walked for a few hundred feet, R.1888-90; Andy could feel dirt and ice under his
socks as they walked downhill, R.1889-90; Andy slipped on ice, but Juice caught
and held him by the hood until the ground flattened out, R.1890; Andy heard
Leech ahead telling Juice and Myore not to step in the snow, R.1889-91; No other
conversation occurred, Id.; Andy sat on a berm with Knight seated to his left, and
their hoods were cut open allowing them to see, R.1891-92, 1895-96; Andy said it
was “pretty light out there” and had no trouble seeing, R.1892; But he could not
see where Myore, Juice or Leech were standing, R.1895-97.
While sitting, Knight looked at Andy and said, “Sorry, bro, I guess this is
it,” R.1896-97; Leech then shot Knight once, in the back, R.1896-97; Knight said
“I’m dead” as he fell forward, rolled a few feet, and did not move, R.1890, 1898;
Andy looked back and saw Leech a few feet behind him, pointing a gun, R.189597; Andy waited to be shot but his hands were cut loose instead, R.1898-99;
Leech stood Andy up, and said “There is your homeboy. Finish it or you’re next,”
R.1899-1900; Andy said “All right,” R.1900; Leech handed a gun to Andy, and
said not to “get any stupid ideas,” id; Leech held another gun to Andy’s head,
R.1900.
Andy pointed the gun at Knight and pulled the trigger, but the gun
jammed, R.1900-01; Andy handed the gun back, over his shoulder, to Leech and
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saw Myore and Juice standing off to the right, R.1901; Leech gave his gun to
Juice, and told him to watch Andy, while he unjammed the gun, R.1901-02;
Leech handed the gun back to Andy, and Juice gave Leech back the other gun,
R.1902-03; Leech put the gun back to Andy’s head, R.1902-03; Knight was a few
feet in front of Andy when he shot him once, R.1902; Andy did not know where
he shot Knight, R.1902; Andy handed the gun back to Leech, R.1902-03.
After the shooting. Andy testified as follows: Myore and Juice lead the way
back up to the truck, and Andy and Leech followed, R.1904; Andy saw that all
three men had guns, R.1903; Everyone got into the truck, sans Knight, sitting in
the same seats as before, R.1905; Leech told Andy to pull his hood up and keep
his head down, Id.; At the bottom of the Weber canyon, Leech pulled Andy’s hood
down, gave him a cigarette, and they returned to the Mann Way home, R.190509; Leech told Andy to look for Knight as if nothing happened, so Leech would
not have to come after Andy’s family, R.1906-09; Leech told Myore to “shampoo
and vacuum the truck anywhere that [Knight and Andy] had been and told Juice
to get all of [their] clothes and … belonging and burn them.” R.1908. Leech said
he would take care of the guns. Id.
It was close to daylight when they arrived back at the Mann Way home,
R.1910; Leech told Andy to take a shower and put his clothes outside the
bathroom door, R.1910-11; Tina brought Andy a change of clothes, R.1911; Andy
was not given his property back, R.1912; Andy used Tina’s phone to call Courtney
to pick him up, and they returned to the motel, R.1912-15; He did not tell anyone
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what happened to Knight, R.1914, 1921; Courtney told Andy that Dawnie had
taken all of his and Knight’s belongings, R.1915.
Andy left the motel to spend the night at a business where his friend
worked, R.1916; The next morning, Tina picked Andy up, took him to back to the
Mann Way home, and returned his phone, R.1916; Andy’s call log and text
messages had been deleted, R.1917; Two days later, Andy and Tina stayed at
Embassy Suites together, R.1918-20, 1967-71; When Myore, Leech, and Dawnie
came over, Andy left, returning only after Leech and the others left, id.
Andy and Tina stayed at a different motel the next day, R.1920; Andy
continued to help Tina with drug dealing by driving a woman to her doctor’s
appointment to ensure that she received the prescription pills she owed Tina,
R.1966-67; The following morning, Andy was arrested, R.1920.
Myore’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony.
Myore was charged with murder, and two counts of aggravated
kidnapping, R.634; He cooperated with the State with hope to limit his exposure
to punishment, R.634-35; Myore did not want to be convicted of murder and
sentenced to a long period of time in prison, R.634-35; He hoped by testifying,
his punishment would be as low as probation, R.635; Myore had not been told a
conviction for aggravated kidnapping carries a possible sentence of life in prison,
R.1413; Myore would be upset if he went to prison and was not eligible for parole
for decades. Id.
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Myore testified as follows: In November 2013, he had been dating Tina for
about a year, R.567-68; he would drive Tina around Salt Lake and Vernal to sell
drugs and collect money, R.572-73, 660-61, 702; And Andy would also drive Tina
around to collect drug debts, R.662.
Myore visited Tina at the Mann Way home on November 23, R.567-68; He
had known Juice for about a year, and also knew Dawnie, R.569-70; Myore met
Leech a few times, id.; but had never before met Andy or Knight, R.570-71; and
did not know a Chris Clyde, R.640-49. Tina, her mother, Teresa, and Leech were
at the home when Myore arrived, R.574-76; a white “cowboy” guy from Uinta
Basin was also at the home, R.654; Myore testified no one had been wearing a
bandana covering their face, R.640-49.
Tina complained to Myore that Andy had not returned her rental car,
R.573-76; When Juice and Dawnie arrived, Myore drove them and Tina around
Kearns to look for the rental car, Andy had not been with them. R.576-79, 637; As
they drove, Tina tried to contact Andy, R.578-79; Myore did not remembering
Tina telling him that Knight had the rental, R.579; That night was the first time
Myore heard Knights name, R.580; Myore drove them around for an hour, but
was unsuccessful at locating the rental, so they returned to the Mann Way home,
R.581.
Myore sat in the kitchen and saw Leech go into the garage two or three
times, R.581-82, 590; Leech acted agitated, R.590; Leech had a square black
handgun in his pants, but never threaten anyone with it, R.590-91; Myore did not
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know anything was going on until Leech flashed his gun and said things about
being mad, R.591; Myore could not hear if anything was happening in the garage
because the door was closed, R.586; Myore said Tina never went inside the
garage, R.586; Myore was unaware Andy was in the garage until Myore went out
there to smoke, R.582-83; Andy and an Asian guy were sitting together, passing a
drug pipe back and forth, and smoking meth, R.585, 638, 651-52; Andy passed
the pipe to Myore, and he got high with them, Id.; Myore was in the garage for
about 10 minutes, but did not speak to Andy or the Asian guy, R.584, 651-52;
Myore had seen Andy come into the home to use the bathroom and then return to
the garage, R.585.
Myore heard Leech and Tina whispering, but could not hear what they
said, R.587; He did not remember telling the district attorney they were mad at
Andy for not knowing where Knight was with the rental car, R.588-89; Myore did
not remember saying Dawnie and Juice were also involved in this whispered
conversation, R.589-90.
Myore brought his gun in from the truck to show Leech, then returned it,
R.592, 656-57; Tina said she found Knight and that he would meet them at Uncle
Chris’ apartment, R.593; Leech asked Myore to drive him, Andy, and Juice to the
apartment, R.593-94; Andy had not been bound or blindfolded when he got into
Myore’s truck, R.594-95; Leech sat in the front seat, and Juice sat in the backseat,
R.595; No conversation occurred on the way to the apartment, R.597.
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Uncle Chris was alone when they arrived, R.597; Everyone either sat on the
couch, or smoked a cigarette, while they waited for Knight, R.598; Tina, Dawnie,
and the Asian guy arrived 10-15 minutes later, R.598-99; Myore did not know
how the Asian guy got there, R.598-99; Leech told Myore to wait outside for
Knight, R.598-99; Myore did not see Knight arrive, but said he showed up about
20-25 minutes later, R.600; Leech escorted Knight into the apartment, R.601-03;
Leech pointed his gun at Knight and Andy, and told them to lay on the floor,
R.601-03; Leech was the only person with a gun, Myore’s gun was in his truck,
and Juice did not have a gun, R.608-09.
Leech asked Myore for get something to tie up Knight and Andy; Myore
brought in speaker wire from his truck, R.604; Leech told Myore to tie them up,
R.604; Tina, Dawnie, and Juice watch what happened, R.605-07; But Chris
stayed in his bedroom, and only came out a few times, R.605; Chris had not come
out while Knight was there, R.605.
Leech helped with tying them up after the speaker wire kept breaking,
R.606; Leech tied up one, and told Myore how to tie up the other, R.606; Leech
emptied their pockets, R.607-08; Myore went and waited outside in his truck,
R.609-10; When Juice escorted Knight out, Knight’s hood had been tied around
his face, R.610; Juice put Knight in the middle of the backseat and got in next to
him, R.610-11; Leech brought Andy out, his hood had also tied around his face,
and put him in the backseat, R.611-12; Leech got in front, and told Myore to start
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driving, R.612; No conversation occurred other than Myore asking for directions,
R.612-17.
Myore drove through Parley’s Canyon towards Park City, R.613; When he
stopped for gas, he said “shit” when he noticed three police officers at the gas
station, R.614-15; Leech did not say anything about the officers, but told Myore to
pay with cash, R.615; Myore returned to the freeway and ended up at Snowbasin,
R.615-17; Leech directed Myore to a road that had a metal gate, R.617.
After Myore parked, Leech asked for his gun, R.617-18; Leech carried
Myore’s gun in his hand, and kept his own gun in his waistband, R.618-623; Juice
did not have a gun, R.619; Leech held both Andy’s and Knight’s arms, while he
escorted them under the gate, and down a small hill, R.619-21; Snow covered a
bit of the ground, but it was melting and mud covered most of the road, R.621;
The moonlight allowed them to see, R.620; Leech lead the way to where they
were going, Myore and Juice followed, R.620-21; No one talked, R.621-22.
They walked down to a small tree on the side of the road, R.622; Myore did
not see Andy ever slip, R.685; Leech told Andy and Knight to kneel a couple feet
in front of him, R.623-25; Myore stood 15 feet away, R.623; Leech shot Knight
once in the back, R.623. Myore did not know which gun Leech used, R.623;
Knight fell and rolled down the embankment, about 10 feet, R.625; Leech said
something to Andy and Andy was somehow untied, R.625-28; Andy walked with
Leech down to Knight’s body, R.626-28; Leech handed Andy a gun, and Andy
shot Knight, R.626; No talking occurred between Leech and Andy before Andy
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shot Knight, R.695; They came back, walked passed Myore and Juice, and lead
the way back to the truck, R.626-27.
Leech returned Myore’s gun, R.628; They arrived back at the Mann Way
home around 5 or 6 in the morning, R.630; Tina, Dawnie, Teresa, and their mom
were at the home, R.630; Myore gave his gun back to Leech to destroy, R.628-29;
Leech told Myore to have his truck detailed, but Myore said he did not do it,
R.631-32; Myore gave his boots, but not his clothes, to Juice to be burned, R.631;
Andy showered and also gave his clothes to Juice, R.632.
Myore contacted police after he learned they were looking for him, R.698;
He was interviewed by law enforcement 5 or 6 times, and lead police to Knight’s
body, R.699; Myore spoke to police and testified because he did not want to
spend his life in prison for a murder he did not commit, R.700.
Admissibility Determination.
Myore’s refusal to testify. The possibility of Myore refusing to testify was
raised for the first time during the final pretrial conference on September 1,
2016—two days before trial.2 R.1626. Myore was still “engaged in plea
negotiations” with the State, and his counsel did not “know at this point if he is
going to assert his Fifth Amendment … or if he intends to take the stand at the
trial next week.” R.1626-27. The State noted that it had first learned of Myore’s
unwillingness to testify two days prior. R.1627.
The State noted Myore had made “several statements to law enforcement”
2

The first day of trial began Tuesday, September 6, 2016. R. Monday, September 5, was
a holiday—Labor Day. R.1632.
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and lead police to Knight’s body. R.1627-28. Myore had subsequently made
“several other statements,” “testified at the preliminary hearing against all the
defendants,” and testified against Juice, at Juice’s trial. R.1628. Upon learning of
Myore’s potential refusal to testify, the State prepared a conditional use
immunity letter. R.1628. Under the State’s use immunity, Myore could “be
compelled to testify [but the State] … cannot use anything … in this case against
[him].” R.1628. The State informed Myore of the potential penalties he faced
should he refuse to testify. R.1629-30. The State requested that Myore “take the
stand, and … either testify or refuse to testify and then the Court can order him to
testify. If … he refuses … the Court can hold him in contempt, he is unavailable,
and the State … will use his preliminary hearing transcript … as an unavailable
witness under Rule 804.” R.1631.
A telephone conference was conducted the next day, September 2, where
Leech was told of the possibility of Myore refusal to testify. R.1632, 1643-44.
On the first day of trial, before jury selection, Leech noted that the “specter
of Mr. Myore refusing to testify” still needed to be addressed, and it could not be
“overstate[d] how big a deal” that prospect would impact his defense. R.1650.
Presuming the State “move[d] to introduce Myore’s transcript” by reading it into
the record, Leech opposed such motion. R.1650. And, “depending on the Court’s
ruling, [Leech] might [seek] a continuance or leave to file interlocutory review.”
R.1650. The court determined that it would hear arguments the next day. R.1650.
But the court “indicate[d] that the inability or unwillingness of one of the parties
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to testify makes them unavailable by definition,” so if the defense “need[ed] to
prepare an interlocutory appeal, [it] should be about it right now.” R.1651.
The next day, without the jury present, the State called Myore to the stand.
R.1758. Myore invoked the 5th Amendment. R.1759-60. Given the conditional
use immunity he had been granted, the court ordered Myore to testify, but he
continued to refuse. R.1761. The State moved to admit Myore’s preliminary
hearing testimony, arguing Leech had been given the opportunity to crossexamine him. R.1778-82.
Leech’s objection. Leech objected, arguing that he did not have a similar
motive or prior opportunity to challenge Myore’s credibility through crossexamination. R.1763-86. Leech argued that both Utah law and court practice
made it clear that credibility is not an issue during a preliminary hearing. R.176364. Because “this was an aggravated murder trial where there is almost zero
physical evidence,” Leech argued Myore’s credibility and “the credibility of [the]
other witnesses is the only issue.” R.1769-70. Leech argued there was a “huge
volume of material[] that [he] did not have at the time of [Myore’s] … the
preliminary hearing.” R.1768. Leech referenced a “binder of all of the statements
[Myore] has made, double sided, … and, literally, not a page goes by where there
is not something different than the previous time, or contradicts a later
statement.” R.1769. And just a “week and a half [before trial, counsel received]
more stuff about [Myore] from another interview [the State conducted] over the
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summer.” R.1770. Defense counsel requested that the court either grant a
continuance or exclude Myore’s testimony. R.1777-84.
Trial court’s determination. The court ruled Myore’s unavailability met the
requirements of rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. R.1786, 2341. The trial court
found that Myore was “unavailable as a witness” for “refusing to testify about the
subject matter despite a court order to do so.” R.1786. The court determined
Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible because Leech had the
opportunity to cross-examine Myore at the preliminary hearing. R.1765, 1786.
Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record. R.565-726. In
doing so, a district attorney sat on the stand and read Myore’s testimony in
response to either the prosecutor’s or defense counsel’s questions, as asked in the
preliminary hearing. R.565-726, 2393.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court violated Utah Rule of Evidence 804 by admitting
the preliminary hearing testimony of Myore—a critical State witness. Preliminary
hearing testimony is only admissible under the rule if the witness is (1)
unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity and similar motive to
cross-examine the witness. Those admissibility requirements were not satisfied
here. Both defense counsel and the magistrate recognized that the limited
purpose of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether probable cause
existed. Due to this, and other limitations, Leech did not have a prior opportunity
and similar motive to develop Myore’s testimony. Where Myore’s testimony
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failed to meet these conditions, rule 804 precluded, as a matter of law, its
admission at trial. Absent the admission of Myore’s testimony, a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for Leech existed, requiring reversal of his
convictions and a new trial.
Point II. This Court should consider the cumulative prejudice of these errors.
ARGUMENT
I.

Admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Myore—a
critical State witness—violated rule 804, because Leech did not
have a similar opportunity or motive to develop Myore’s
testimony.
This Court should grant Leech a new trial where the trial court erred in

admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of Myore—a critical State witness—
because Leech did not have a similar opportunity or motive to develop the
testimony at the preliminary hearing, as he would have had at trial. See State v.
Goins, 2017 UT 61; State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2; Utah R. Evid. 804; Utah Const. art.
I, §12 (limiting the purpose of preliminary hearings to establishing probable
cause). Admission of Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony was prejudicial—
requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶48
(holding admission of witness’s preliminary hearing testimony under rule 804
was error, warranting reversal because “a reasonable likelihood exist[ed] that
absent the error, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant”).
Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony was hearsay, and its admission
implicated the rule against hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 804. Myore’s testimony “was
therefore admissible only if it qualified under an exception to the bar on hearsay”
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under rule 804. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶24; Utah R. Evid. 804. For preliminary hearing
testimony to be admissible under rule 804, (1) the declarant must be unavailable;
and (2) the declarant’s testimony must have been “given … at a trial, hearing, or
lawful deposition;” and is “now offered against a party who had ... an opportunity
and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.” Utah
R. Evid. 804 (b)(1)(A)-(B); Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶25.
Under the first admissibility prong, the court found Myore “unavailable as
a witness” for “refusing to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to
do so.” Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(2). Under the second admissibility prong, the court
found Leech had been allowed to cross-examine Myore at the preliminary
hearing, therefore, he had “an opportunity and similar motive to develop”
Myore’s testimony. Utah R. Evid. 804 (b)(1)(B); R.1784-87. The court determined
Myore’s unavailability met the rules requirements, and admitted the testimony.
Id.
Recent, our Supreme Court held that rule 804 precludes, as a matter of
law, the admission of preliminary hearing testimony at trial. See Goins, 2017 UT
61, ¶29 (overruling per se rule—that the rules of evidence do “not preclude, as a
matter of law, testimony given in a preliminary hearing from being admitted at
trial” in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1987)). Therefore, the trial court’s
admission of Myore’s testimony under rule 804 was error, prejudicing Leech and
his right to a fair trial.
Myore’s testimony was inadmissible because defense counsel did not have
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an adequate opportunity and similar motive to develop it during the preliminary
hearing. See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶34. At the time of the preliminary hearing,
Leech was without the benefit of important, later-obtained, discovery. See infra
Point IA. And based on the structural limitations imposed on preliminary
hearings, details critical to Leech’s defense were not developed. Id. Due to these
and other errors, defense counsel did not have an adequate opportunity and
similar motive to develop Myore’s testimony during the preliminary hearing,
making it inadmissible, as a matter of law, under rule 804. See Goins, 2017 UT
61, ¶34. In addition, Myore’s was a critical State witness and the admission of his
testimony was prejudicial because “a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the
error, the result would have been more favorable” to Leech. Id. ¶48; Point IB,
infra.
A.

Myore’s preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible because
Leech did not have an adequate opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony during the preliminary hearing.

Under rule 804(b)(1), former testimony of an unavailable witness “is
admissible against a defendant only if defense counsel had both (1) an
opportunity and (2) similar motive to develop the testimony at the preliminary
hearing.” Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶29; see id. ¶30 n.8 (noting Brooks’ court discussed
predecessor to rule 804). In 1987, the supreme court announced a per se rule that
did “not preclude, as a matter of law, testimony given in a preliminary hearing
from being admitted at trial” under the rules of evidence. State v. Brooks, 638
P.2d 537 (Utah 1987) (holding “cross-examination takes place at preliminary
38

hearing and at trial under the same motive and interest”) superseded by
constitutional amendment as stated in Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶37; Goins, 2017 UT 61,
¶30 (acknowledging Brooks created per se rule allowing the admissibility of
preliminary hearing testimony “so long as the requirements of unavailability and
an opportunity to cross-examine are satisfied”).
Under Brooks, confrontation considerations regarding the admissibility of
preliminary hearing testimony at trial were determined under the Sixth
Amendment by using the two-pronged test outlined in Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S.56 (1980). See Brooks, 638 P.2d at 539. At the time, neither Utah’s
Constitution, nor its rules of evidence, provided a separate basis for analyzing
determinations of admissibility. Id. But recently, our supreme court overruled
Brooks’ per se rule, finding that the premise of its “decision had been overtaken
by a constitutional amendment—an amendment limiting the function of
preliminary examinations…to determining whether probable cause exists.” Ellis,
2018 UT 2, ¶38 (cleaned up); Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶29.
The supreme court recognized the amendment to article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution, “undermine[d] one of Brooks key premises—that defense
counsel’s motive and interest are the same in either setting.” Id. ¶31 (quotation
cleaned up). “Since 1994, preliminary hearings—at least those that function as
the amended constitution envisions—potentially limit the scope of crossexamination such that the blanket statement issued in Brooks no longer rings
true.” Id. ¶32. This is because the amendment “specifically limit[ed] the purpose
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of preliminary hearings in a manner that can undercut defense counsel’s
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing and thereby
modif[ied] the interest counsel has in developing testimony on crossexamination.” Id. ¶41. Given this limitation, “a defense attorney…does not have
an incentive to prepare to thoroughly cross-examine on credibility.” Id. ¶34; see
id. ¶33 (recognizing “by and large, article I, section 12 places most credibility
determinations outside the reach of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing”).
In this case, the record reflects that both the magistrate and defense
counsel recognized that the purpose of the preliminary hearing was limited to a
determination of probable cause. R.832-33, 1763-86. The magistrate began the
hearing by clarifying, to Leech and the co-defendants, that “this is a probable
cause hearing, it’s not a trial” and “[d]ifferent standards of proof apply.” R.833.
He stated the “purpose of th[e] proceeding” was “for the State to put on evidence
in an effort to demonstrate probable cause that the offenses charged were
committed and that you were the ones who committed those offenses.” R.832-33.
And he explained that “[o]ne of the most important” differences between a
preliminary hearing and a trial was “that any doubts or questions about evidence
. . . get resolved in favor of the State and against the defendants.” R.833. The
magistrate continued by saying, “If probable cause is found under that analysis,
then the case would be bound over for further proceedings at which time you
would all be afforded your entire complement of constitutional rights.” R.833.
The magistrate’s explanation denotes its understanding of the limited purpose of
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the preliminary hearings. See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶34; Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶38.
Similarly, defense counsel also referenced the long-established
understanding among criminal practitioners that witness credibility has little to
“no bearing on the issue of probable cause,” and a magistrate “may limit or
prohibit [such] cross-examination.” Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶35; R.1763-86. Counsel
argued rule 804, was not a blanket rule allowing for the automatic admission of a
witness’s preliminary hearing testimony based solely on unavailability, and
counsel’s technical opportunity to cross-examine. Id. ¶29; R.1762-63; See
Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶12 (“An issue is preserved … when it has
been ‘presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on [it]’”).
Specifically, counsel argued the trial court must look at “the motive at the
preliminary hearing” when determining whether preliminary hearing testimony
was subject to “the right[s] to confrontation and … due process,” encompassed
within rule 804. R.1763; Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶29. Counsel further contended that
it has been made “very clear that credibility is not an issue at preliminary
[hearings].” R.1763; Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶33 (recognizing “by and large, article I,
section 12 places most credibility determinations outside the reach of a
magistrate at a preliminary hearing”).
Defense counsel recounted that in his years of doing preliminary hearings,
he could not “count how many times [he] had been told ‘Credibility is not an
issue. Move on, counsel. That’s for a trier of fact.’” R.1763-64. And he agreed that
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was “a correct statement of law.” R.1764. However, counsel pointed out that it
would be a “little disingenuous to not recognize …the differences between a
prelim[inary hearing] and a trial.” R.1764. Most significantly, is “the practice in
this jurisdiction to limit cross-examination at preliminary hearing[s].” Id. Due to
these limitations, counsel argued “Myore was not asked about any of his prior
statements … he was not cross-examined as to his credibility … and that wasn’t
done because … it’s not relevant at the prelim[inary hearing but] that …absolutely
would have been done at trial.” Id.; Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶34.
Like in Goins, the State here relied on Brooks, and subsequent case law, to
support its argument for the admission of Myore’s testimony at trial. See Goins,
2017 UT 61, ¶30; R.1780-82. The State argued that defense counsel relied on “the
same arguments that Counsel made 35 years ago [in Brooks] … that the very
nature of a preliminary is different in motive and interest.” R.1781. The State
contended that under state and federal case law, it had been settled that
“[d]efense counsel’s motive and interest are the same in either setting. He acts in
both situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing innocence of his
client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place at [a] preliminary hearing and at
trial, [with] the same motive and interest.” Id. The trial court agreed. R.1765,
1786.
But in Ellis, the supreme court recognized that “the premises of the Brooks
decision had been overtaken by [] constitutional amendment … [and] that ‘[its]
blanket statement … no longer rings true.’” Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶40 (discussing the
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Goins’ decision’s foreclosure of the admissibility of preliminary hearing
testimony at trial absent a “showing that ‘defense counsel really did possess the
same motive and was permitted a full opportunity for cross-examination’”). As a
result, “Ellis [was] entitled to the benefit of the Goins analysis. Id.
Like the defendant in Ellis, Leech too “is entitled to the benefit of the Goins
analysis” where his case was pending on direct review when the new rule in Goins
was announced. Id. (citing State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶67, 371 P.3d 1). The
State provided no basis to “conclude that [Leech’s] preliminary hearing motive to
cross-examine was similar to what would have existed at trial.” Ellis, 2018 UT 2,
¶40 (citation omitted). Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting Myore’s
preliminary hearing testimony under rule 804. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶40; Goins, 2017
UT 61, ¶46.
B.

The error was prejudicial.

The improper admission of preliminary hearing testimony at trial warrants
reversal where there is a reasonable likelihood that the evidence affected the
outcome. State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, ¶40 (recognizing errors in
interpreting rules of evidence require reversal when “there is a ‘reasonable
likelihood’ that the verdict would have been different” (citation omitted)). In
other words, Leech need not show “the jury would have more likely than not”
returned a different verdict but for the improperly admitted evidence. State v.
Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶92. Rather, error is prejudicial if there is “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the [jury verdict].” Id. ¶86. “Prejudicial
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analysis is counter factual” in this context, requiring the Court to “assess the
likely outcome of a trial in which [Myore’s] preliminary hearing testimony is
eliminated and the jury is left to consider the remainder of the prosecutor’s case.”
Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶42.
Myore’s was a critical State witness whose testimony “provided key pieces
of evidence that the jury likely credited” and was necessary for the State’s to
establish Leech’s culpability. Id. ¶43. Admission of Myore’s testimony was
prejudicial because (1) a critical aspect of Leech’s defense strategy—the
opportunity to undermine Myore’s credibility through cross-examination—was
rendered substantially ineffective; (2) the State relied heavily on Myore’s
testimony in both its opening statement and closing argument; (3) Leech was
denied a continuance to explore the likely possibility that Myore would become
available to testify or to allow the opportunity to prepare its defense in light of the
court’s admissibility ruling; and (4) without the admission of Myore’s testimony,
the remaining evidence was so inherently unbelievable that the jury would have
been unlikely to rely on it to convict.
1. Leech was prejudiced by the admission of Myore’s testimony because a
critical aspect of Leech’s defense strategy—the opportunity to
undermine Myore’s credibility through cross-examination—was
rendered substantially ineffective.
Undermining Myore’s credibility, through cross-examination of his
inconsistent statements, formed the crux of Leech’s defense. See Utah R. Evid.
801 (d); State v. King, 2012 UT App 203, ¶36 (referencing supreme court’s
suggestion” that inconsistent statements are ‘not limited to diametrically opposed
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answers but may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or
changes of position’”). But Myore’s testimony was ruled admissible on the second
day of trial, after the jury was selected. R.1786. Accordingly, a key aspect of
Leech’s defense strategy—challenging the believability of Myore—was severely
impacted by admission of Myore’s testimony. See infra subpart 3.
In objecting, Leech emphasized “this was an aggravated murder trial
where there is almost zero physical evidence,” making Myore’s credibility and
“the credibility of [the] other witnesses the only issue.” R.1769-70. Juror
observation of Myore’s demeanor was imperative to Leech’s overall defense in
not only undermining Myore’s credibility, but in undermining the credibility of
the State’s other witnesses. Leech pointed to a binder filled with contradictory
statements made by Myore to support his argument of the prejudice to his
defense. R.1770.
Leech argued that without Myore taking the stand, his efforts to “crossexamine or impeach or prove that a little stack of papers is lying … [would be]
completely ineffective.” R.1770. Furthermore, admitting Myore’s testimony
allowed the State to “not only get that evidence in,” but to also improperly
“bolster [the] other witnesses when we’re trying to attack all of their credibility …
violat[ing his] right[s] to confrontation, … a fair trial, [and] due process.” R.1770.
Counsel argued “The only thing that matters from our perspective is that Mr.
Leech get a fair trial. And I do not believe that is possible … with a transcript of
Myore’s testimony. [Again], it is ineffectual to cross-examine a piece of paper …
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and allowing [it] to come in … to bolster the other witnesses who all have massive
credibility issues, is just patently unfair.” R.1773.
Absent Myore’s testimony, the jury was left with the testimony of Andy and
the other State witnesses, all of which conflicted on every key point in the
evidence. See Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶43. Myore’s testimony was the only other alleged
account of Knight’s shooting. And, without corroboration Andy’s narrative was so
inherently unreliable the jury would not have credited it to establish Leech’s guilt.
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, ¶¶31-32 (finding prejudice in the admission of
hearsay testimony corroborating complainant’s testimony where “there was no
physical evidence of [the offense], and no testimony directly supporting
[complainant’s] account”), aff’d 2008 UT 47; State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,
407-08 (Utah 1989) (concluding there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome where the case “hinged on a determination of
credibility,” there was no corroborating physical evidence, and the victim's
version of events was bolstered principally by inadmissible expert testimony).
The evidence established Myore also had a motive to fabricate his testimony in
order to mitigate his culpability and avoid a life prison sentence. R.634-35. This,
and the improper bolstering of Andy’s testimony, prejudiced Leech.
Attempting to mitigate some of the prejudice, Leech moved to have Myore
take the stand so his refusal to testify was done in the jury’s presence. R.2340–41.
The court ruled that other than for “theatrics,” it would be inappropriate to put
Myore on the stand just so jurors could witness his refusal. See R.2342; State v.
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Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 25 (“Though a prosecutor may not call a witness simply to
‘impress[] upon the jury . . . the claim of privilege,’ there are legitimate reasons to
call a witness who has indicated she will invoke the privilege to remain silent.”
(alternations in original) (citation omitted)). Given it is the province of the jury to
“serve[] as the exclusive judge of both the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given particular evidence,” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 31, Leech
had a legitimate reason for jurors to witness Myore’s refusal—so jurors could
exercise their exclusive prerogative of judging his credibility. Id.
Leech noted the particular importance witness credibility played, and
having Myore take the stand would allow the jury to glean something of his
demeanor and assess his credibility. R.2342 (explaining that putting Myore on
the stand provided jurors “some means to assess his credibility, however small”).
The court’s denial to allow for Myore to make his refusal in front of the jury
further hindered Leech’s efforts to mitigate the prejudice admitting Myore’s
testimony had on the defense.
The prejudicial effect of admitting Myore’s testimony was exacerbated by
the manner in which the testimony was admitted. Myore’s testimony was not just
simply read verbatim into the record, instead, the State had attorneys parade as
actors to play out the preliminary hearing for the jury:
[Referring to the preliminary-hearing transcript,] [s]o we provided a
copy to [Leech’s counsel], to the Court, and we have a representative
from the District Attorney’s Office, Tad May, who is here to read the
part of Myore . . . I will be reading the part of the prosecutor, who
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was actually me anyway. And [Leech’s counsel] will read the crossexamination questions that were presented at the prelim.
R. 2393. May, a district attorney, sat on the witness stand as the other attorneys
played their parts. R.2395–96. The reading of the preliminary hearing lasted
approximately two hours. R.563.
The means of introducing Myore’s testimony, imbued the testimony with
the imprimatur of the State, which likely induced the jury to give more weight to
Myore’s testimony than it otherwise would have. In doing so, the State also
succeeded in bolstering the credibility of Andy’s testimony. State v. Sibert, 310
P.2d 388, 390, 392-93 (Utah 1957) (prejudice where the case focused on
inconsistent statements and the prosecution used inadmissible hearsay to bolster
the witness). Denying jurors the ability to see, however briefly, and to assess
Myore’s credibility, prejudiced Leech. Combined, these errors created “a
probability sufficient to undermine” this Court’s confidence in the jury’s verdict.
Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶92. Absent the improper admission of Myore’s testimony, a
reasonable likelihood exists that the result of the trial would have been more
favorable to Leech. Id.
2. Leech was prejudiced by the State’s reliance on Myore’s testimony in its
opening statement and closing arguments.
In its opening statement, the State admitted to jurors that the “majority of
evidence [would] come from the testimony of witnesses who were there that
night.” R.1813. And, although the witnesses were “not people without their issues
… lifestyle choices … drug [use] … criminal histories … and all of these different
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things,” they would all “tell [the jury] the same thing about what happened that
night.” R.1814. The State explained that it had to rely on these witnesses’
testimony because there was no physical evidence tying Leech to the offenses.
R.1813. Knight’s body could not tie Leech to the shooting because it had “been
subject to weather conditions” and animal predation for an extended period of
time. R.1812-13. Leech had allegedly destroyed evidence of clothing, shoes, and
guns so he could not be linked to the offenses in that manner. R.1813. And, other
than the recovery of one weapon, no “DNA, blood spatter, or fingerprints” existed
to tie Leech to the offenses. R.1813.
Instead, Myore’s testimony was relied on to link Leech to the offenses.
R.1805-14. Jurors were told that Myore’s testimony, was given “under oath,” and
would explain “what was going on in that house” on Mann Way; that Leech
doesn’t just have his own gun, but has [Myore’s gun], he has two weapons on
him;” and that it would explain where speaker wire used to tie up Andy and
Knight came from. R.1807-10.
In closing arguments, the State’s reliance on Myore’s testimony went
further. R.2602-32, 2669-94. Myore’s testimony was used to corroborate and
bolster the following: (1) Leech committed two counts of aggravated robbery by
taking property from Andy’s and Knight’s pockets, R.2607-09 (admitting Andy
did not know who took Knight’s property, but referencing Myore’s testimony to
argue it was Leech), 2682; (2) Leech obstructed justice by telling Myore to clean
his truck, telling Juice to burn things, and getting rid of the weapons, R.2609,
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2626 (“[Myore’s] testimony is he gave Andy’s clothes[, boots] to Juice to burn”
and gave Leech his gun); (3) where the speaker wire came from, that Leech asked
for it, and that it was old and kept breaking when used to tie Andy and Knight up,
R.2614-15, 2682; (4) Leech was “leading the charge, R.2616-18; (5) Myore’s truck
was at a gas station in Summit County and timeline of events, R.2619; and (6)
Leech’s culpability in the shooting death of Knight, 2622-32, 2682.
Here, the prejudice resulting from the State’s heavy reliance on Myore’s
improperly admitted testimony, together with the other errors argued,
undermines the confidence in the jury’s verdict and “‘substantially affected
[Leech’s] right to a fair trial.” State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ¶31; State v.
Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989).
3. Leech was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance.
The trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance as a remedy to mitigate
some of the substantial prejudice that the late notice, and court’s finding of
Myore’s unavailability, had on Leech’s defense, requires reversal. See State v.
Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8.
Defense counsel requested a continuance as a remedy for the late notice of
Myore’s refusal to testify, and the trial court’s subsequent determination allowing
the admission of Myore’s testimony at trial. R.1777. Counsel argued that “nobody
was on notice” that Myore would not be testifying because he “was in custody and
… had apparently agreed” to the State’s plea offer. R.1767. Counsel noted that the
defense was not made aware this “was even a possibility” until a day before trial.
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R.1628-32, 1643-44. Before that time, no one “had any inkling that [Myore]
would be unavailable.” R.1768. And, it was not until the second day of trial that
the court addressed the issue and made its finding. R.1760-61.
The court understood the defense’s “arguments associated with the lastminute notice associated with [Myore’s unavailability]” but was not persuaded
that “[Myore’s] unavailability should result in th[e] trial not going forward.”
R.1771-72. The court contended that at the pretrial conference, defense counsel
represented the defense was ready to proceed, but now is arguing he possesses “a
year and a half of additional statement, … information, and [] evidence … critical
to [the defense’s] case” R.1772.
Counsel responded it was “with the anticipation that Myore was going to
take the stand” that he represented the defense was ready to proceed. R.1772.
Had he known about Myore’s refusal to testify, he “would have sought” other
remedies. R.1772. Counsel argued a continuance would allow time for the defense
to evaluate whether Myore would soon agree to the State’s plea offer, making him
available to testify. R.1777. Because it was only when Myore was recently
informed that he was facing decades in prison under the State’s current offer that
he suddenly became “reluctant to testify.” R.1777.
Counsel pointed out that Myore’s current “position [was] untenable” since
he had already “implicated himself in two kidnappings, one of which resulted in
death.” R.1777. And, because “he [did] not want a trial” “a substantial likelihood”
existed that he would soon change his position on testifying. R.1783. Counsel
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recognized that the jury had been selected, “and everybody wants this thing to go
[forward, but] the only thing that matters from [the defense’s] perspective is that
Mr. Leech get[s] a fair trial.” R.1773. So “the fact that it’s coming up last minute
shouldn’t change the calculus and the remedies available” to the defense. R.1771.
Here, the denial of a continuance violated Leech’s rights to due process and
a fair trial. See Utah Const. art. I, §12; U.S. Const. amend XIV. Leech’s
substantive rights were prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to grant a
continuance as a remedy to mitigate some of the prejudice the lack of notice of
Myore’s refusal to testify and subsequent admission of his testimony, had on
Leech’s defense. Id; Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8.
The record reflects counsel diligently prepared the defense’s theory “with
the anticipation that Myore was going to take the stand.” R.1772. Counsel had
scoured and investigated two years of discovery in order to gain “a deeper
understanding of the case.” R.1768. From this discovery, some of which was
received just over a week before trial, counsel noted he was prepared to challenge
Myore’s credibility with a binder full of his contradictory statements. R.1768-70.
The fact the court’s finding of Myore’s unavailability was determined after the
jury was selected, was not due to any dilatory behavior attributable to defense
counsel. R.1771-73.
In fact, it was defense counsel who reminded the trial court, before the jury
had been selected, of the potential of Myore’s refusal to testify was still looming.
R.1650 (Leech reminding court of the “specter of Mr. Myore refusing to testify”).
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Counsel raised the issue because of the significant prejudice Myore not testifying
would have on his ability to effectively defend against the charges. Id. (Leech
noting he could not “overstate how big a deal” the prospect of Myore refusal
would have on the defense). Counsel stressed his objection to any motion the
State would make to “introduce Myore’s transcript” and noted remedies it might
pursue if the court allowed its admission. Id. (counsel noting that “depending on
the Court’s ruling, [Leech] might [seek] a continuance or leave to file
interlocutory review”). It was the trial court who decided not to address the issue
until the next day—after jury selection. R.1650. But regardless, Leech’s “right to a
fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court [and] opposing party … that
may have been caused by a continuance.” State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, ¶43
(citation omitted).
Because the State’s case centered around witness credibility, counsel’s
ability to effectively undermine Myore’s credibility was critical to Leech’s right to
a fair trial. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, ¶8. A continuance would have given Leech time
to prepared his defense in light of the unavailability ruling. Id. Or it would have
given Leech the opportunity to evaluate whether Myore’s unavailability would be
resolved by his pending criminal case. Id. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to
grant a continuance violated Leech’s substantive rights, resulting in prejudice. Id.
4. Absent admission of Myore’s testimony, the remaining witnesses were
so inherently unbelievable that a reasonable jury would have acquitted.
Admission of Myore testimony was essential to the State’s ability to
implicate Leech. Myore’s testimony permitted the State to corroborate key
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aspects of Andy’s and the other witnesses’ version of the events; bolstered Andy’s
narrative of Knight’s death—the only other eyewitness account; and, bolster
Myore’s own credibility—attributed with leading detectives to Knight’s body. See
supra.
Andy, a convicted felon and admitted liar, had a strong motive to minimize
his culpability by fabricating his role in the events leading to Knight’s death. Andy
admitted to lying about principle events in each of his interviews with law
enforcement. R.1923-51. The testimonies of the other witnesses lacked any
materially consistency that would have been credited by the jury. And Andy’s
testimony was so inherently unreliable and unbelievable on its own that absent
corroboration and bolstering from Myore, regarding key evidence, the jury’s
verdict would likely have been different. See Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶43. Thus, the
overwhelming prejudice warrants reversal. See id. ¶¶43, 45.
II.

The cumulative effect of any combination of errors establishes
prejudice.
The cumulative prejudice of any combination of the errors requires

reversal. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, this Court will reverse if the
cumulative effect of multiple errors undermines the Court's confidence in the
verdict. State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶61. That was the case here, where
multiple errors compromised the fairness of the trial. See supra Parts IA-B.
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CONCLUSION
Leech respectfully requests that this Court reverse his.convictions and
remand for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated : November 02, 2016
/s/ RANDALL ~C&lY
03 :08:31 PM
District Court Judge ·

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTES

STATE OF UTAH,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,

Case No: 141900235 FS

vs.
CHRISTOPHER KIM LEECH,
Defendant.

Judge:

RANDALL SKANCHY

Date:

November 2, 2016

Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

PRESENT
Clerk:

saram

Prosecutor: VINCENT B MEISTER
NATHAN J EVERSHED
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PATRICK W CORUM
WOJCIECH S NITECKI
LACEY C SINGLETON
MELISSA G STIRBA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 15, 1978
Sheriff Office#: 243621
Audio
Tape Number:

N42

Tape Count: 12:36

CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty

2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty

3. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty

4. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty

5. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty
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Case No: 141900235 Date:

Nov 02, 2016

6. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 09/13/2016 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to life in prison without parole.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than fifteen years and
which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to life in prison without parole.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
·To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your custody for

transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts one and three are to run consecutive to each other.

All other counts are to

run concurrent.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
ASIAN CHRIS
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CRAZY CHRIS

Restitution

Amount: $850.00 Plus Interest

Pay in behalf of: VICTIM
This restitution is to be paid joint and severally with the co-defendant s .
CUSTODY
The defendant i s present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 141900235 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:

TRANSPORTATION ADC adc-transportation@slco.org

EMAIL:

TRANSPORTATION UDC udc-transportation@utah.gov

EMAIL:

RECORDS UDC udc-records@utah.gov
11/02/2016

/s/ SARA MOFFITT

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUMB

Utah Con st. art. I, § 12
A rticle I, Section 12. [Rights of accused pe rsons.)
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel , to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him , to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him , to ha e compulsory process to compel the attendance of witness s in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance sha ll any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determ ining whether probable cause exists un less
otherwise provided by statute. othing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliabl hearsay evidenc as defin d by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
resp ct to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or ru le.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-302
§ 76-5-202.

Aggravated murder

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or

knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or other
correctional institution;
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct,
or criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed, or during
which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim
who was killed;
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the
victim and the actor;
(d) the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a
child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse
of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, child abuse as defined in Subsection
76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson,
aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, or child
kidnapping;
(e) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct,
or criminal episode during which the actor committed the crime of abuse or
desecration of a dead human body as defined in Subsection 76-9-704(2)(e);
(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding br preventing an

arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal
authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape from
lawful custody;
:
(g) the homicide was committed for pecuniary gain;
(h) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to commit
the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the
promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide;
(i) the actor previously committed or was convicted of:

(i) aggravated murder under this section;

(ii) attempted aggravated murder under this section;
(iii) murder, Section 76-5-203;
(iv) attempted murder, Section 76-5-203; or
(v) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state
would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(i);

U) the actor was previously convicted of:
(i) aggravated assault, Subsection 76-5-103(2);
(ii) mayhem, Section 76-5-105;
(iii) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301;
(iv) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;
(v) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302;
(vi) rape, Section 76-5-402;
(vii) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(viii) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;
(ix) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;
(x) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403;
(xi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;
(xii) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1;
(xiii) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
(xiv) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103;
(xv) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203;
(xvi) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302;
(xvii) felony discharge of a firearm, Section 76-10-508.1; or

(xviii) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this
state would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)G);
(k) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:
(i) preventing a witness from testifying;
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal
proceedings or official investigation;
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or
participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or
(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of
laws;
(1) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a candidate
for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that
official position, act, capacity, or candidacy;

(m) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive
officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court
official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is either on duty
or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position,
and the actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or
has held that official position;
(n) the homicide was committed:
(i) by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or
similar device which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area,
dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed or delivered; or
(ii) by means of any weapon of mass destruction as defined in Section 76-10401;

(o) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of
any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats or force with
intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public
conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to
direct the route or movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert control
over the public conveyance;
(p) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a poison or of
any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage,
or quantity;

(q) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, hostage, or for
ransom;
(r) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or
exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before
death;
(s) the actor dismembers, mutilates, or disfigures the victim's body, whether
before or after death, in a manner demonstrating the actor's depravity of mind; or
(t) the victim, at the time of the death of the victim:
(i) was younger than 14 years of age; and
(ii) was not an unborn child.

(2) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor, with reckless

indifference to human life, causes the death of another incident to an act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor is a major
participant in the commission or attempted commission of:
(a) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a);
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;
(c) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;
(e) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; or
(f) sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1.

(3)(a) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated
murder is a capital felony.
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, aggravated
murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 763-207. 7.
(c)(i) Within 60 days after arraignment of the defendant, the prosecutor may file
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice shall be served on the
defendant or defense counsel and filed with the court.

(ii) Notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be served and filed more than
60 days after the arraignment upon written stipulation of the parties or upon a
finding by the court of good cause.
·
(d) Without the consent of the prosecutor, the court may not accept a plea of
guilty to noncapital first degree felony aggravated murder during the period in
which the prosecutor may file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty under
Subsection (3)(c)(i).
(e) If the defendant was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was
committed, aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as
provided in Section 76-3-207. 7.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted
aggravated murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted
to cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances
provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was
not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder.
(s)(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that
constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of aggravated
murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based on an aggravating
circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate
offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
·
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel
a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct;

(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual
Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or

kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years
and which may be for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier
of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated
kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission
of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a
grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or .(b), a court finds that
a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests
of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may
impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which m~y be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) 10 years and which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.

(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced
under Subsection (3)(c).
(6) Subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c) do not apply if the defendant was younger than
18 years of age at the time of the offense.
(7) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 763-406.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15; Laws
1995, c. 337, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 5, eff. April 29,
1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 69, § 2, eff. May 4,
1998; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 11, eff. April
30, 2007; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 3, eff. May 14, 2013.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-302
§ 76-5-302. Aggravated kidnapping

(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:

(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel
a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual
Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or

kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years
and which may be for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier
of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated
kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission
of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a
grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that
a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests

of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may
impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) 10 years and which may be for life; or

(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced
under Subsection (3)(c).
(6) Subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c) do not apply if the defendant was younger than
18 years of age at the time of the offense.
(7) Imprisonment under this section is mandatory in accordance with Section 763-406.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15; Laws
1995, c. 337, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 5, eff. April 29,
1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 69, § 2, eff. May 4,
1998; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 11, eff. April
30, 2007; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 3, eff. May 14, 2013.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery

(I) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a
robbery'' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

Credits

Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c.
271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1. eff. May 5. 2003.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-306
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice in criminal investigations or proceedings --

Elements--Penalties--Exceptions
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder,

delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecuti~n, conviction, or
punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:
(a) provides any person with a weapon;
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing
any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment of any person;
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;
(e) harbors or conceals a person;
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding

discovery or apprehension;
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire
communications or of a pending application for an order authorizing the
interception of wire communications;
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after

a judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or

U) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct
constituting an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation.
(2)(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of
this section, and includes:

(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political

subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United
States; and
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an
adult.
(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any
district, possession, or territory of the United States, is a:
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment
without parole;
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years;
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any
period exceeding one year; and
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period
of one year or less.
(3) Obstruction of justice is:
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a
capital felony or first degree felony;
(b) a third degree felony if:
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree
felony and the actor violates Subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (t);
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a
capital or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1)(a);
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or
(iv) a violation of Subsection (1)(h); or

(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated
under Subsection (3)(a) or (b).
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the
conduct constituting an offense.
(5) Subsection (1)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is
governed by Section 62A-7-402.
(6) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to:
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5;
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316;
(c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed
by Section 76-8-508;
(d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed
by Section 76-8-508.3; or
(e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed
by Section 76-8-509.
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree
felony if the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official
custody as defined in Section 76-8-309.
Cre dits
Laws 2001, c. 209, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 307, § 2, eff. April 30,
2001; Laws 2003, c. 179, § 1; Laws 2004, c. 140, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws
2004, c. 240, § 3, eff. March 22, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 13, § 27, eff. March 1,
2005; Laws 2009, c. 213, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009.

Utah R. Evid. 804
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay-When the Declarant is
Unavailable as a Witness
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be
unavailable as a witness if the declarant:
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's

statement because the court rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;

(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a thenexisting infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been
able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's
attendance.
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent
the declarant from attending or testifying.
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:

(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given
during the current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had--or, in a civil case, whose predecessor
in interest had--an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-,
or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a

statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant's death to be
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that:

(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the

person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to
invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to
civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its

trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about:
(A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,

relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about
that fact; or
(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the declarant

was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately
associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is likely to be
accurate.

Credits
[Amended effective October 1,

1992;

November 1, 2004; December 1, 2011.]
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: February 15, 20 I 7
/s/ Thomas R. Lee
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Associate Chief Justice

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----00000----

State of Utah,
Appellee,
ORDER
V.

Appellate Case No. 20160995-SC
Christopher Kim Leech,
Appellant.

----00000----

This Court has elected to provisionally retain the above-entitled appeal on its docket.
The prior order of transfer to the Court of Appeals is vacated; however, the Court retains
its discretion to transfer the appeal at a later time if circumstances warrant. This matter
also is stayed pending the issuance of decisions in State v. Pham, 2016 0502, and State
v. Goins, 2016 0485. The Court will then determine whether it will summarily dispose
of this case or request briefing.
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Kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code §76-5-302; two
counts of Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
§76-6-302; and Obstructing Justice, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code §76-8-306(1). R.1-4, 121-22, 403-07. At the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing, Leech was bound over. R.116-22, 1251-1621.
A six-day jury trial was held in September 2016. R.544-50, 562-64, 727-28,
739-41. Leech was found guilty on all counts. R. 739-48; Addendum A. He was
sentenced as follows: Aggravated Murder, life in prison without parole (LWOP);
Aggravated Kidnapping, two indeterminate term of 15 years-to-life; Aggravated
Robbery, two indeterminate terms of 5 years-to-life; Obstructing Justice, an
indeterminate term of 5 years-to-life. R.805-08. The court ordered the
Aggravated Murder conviction to run consecutively to one Aggravated
Kidnapping conviction, all other counts were run concurrently. Id. Leech timely
appealed. R. 809-14.
The supreme court stayed Leech's appeal pending dec~sions in State v.

Pham, 20160502-SC, and State v. Goins, 20160485-SC. See Addendum B (Order
dated February 15, 2017). Leech's appeal was poured over to this Court. See
Addendum C (Letter dated March 19, 2018).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Offense.

Cleat Knight's body was discovered in a remote area of Snowbasin on
January 6, 2014. R.2231, 2282-283, 2413, 2422-428; StEx.73. Knight's body
4

ADDENDUMD

The Order of the Court is stated below:
•,
Dated: March 15, 2018
Isl Thomas R. Lee
Associate Chief Justice
02:23:10 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

State of Utah,
Appellee,
ORDER
V.

Appellate Case No. 20160995-SC
Christopher Kim Leech,
Appellant.

----00000----

Pursuant to the Court's Order of February 15, 2017, this case was stayed pending the
issuance of decisions in State v. Pham, #20160502-SC and State v. Goins, #20160485SC. Those cases have now been resolved. Therefore, the stay is lifted.
The February 15, 2017 order, also notified the parties that it had elected to provisionally
retain this case on its docket but that it possessed the discretion to transfer the appeal at
a later time if circumstances warranted. The Court has now determined that
circumstances do warrant transfer. Accordingly, the appeal is transferred to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that Court. The address
for the Utah Court of Appeals is:
Utah Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
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